Neurotecnología e Inteligencia Artificial: Fronteras legales y de gobernanza

134 Neurotecnología e Inteligencia Artificial: Fronteras legales y de gobernanza or persona? Do we need “cognitive liberty” rights to ensure individuals retain con- trol over their unexpressed thoughts and any AI-generated expressions thereof ? If a gAI system anticipates and produces a painting from my thoughts before I even consciously decide to create it, could someone else intercept or copy that output? If I have not even realized the idea consciously, do I have a claim to it? IP law has to answer these questions by balancing the interests of creators, disseminators, and the public. 6. ARTWITHOUT SKILLS, ARTWITHOUT SENSES Damien Hirst’s art work “The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of So- meone Living” (1991) is instructive. Its value hinges on conceptual innovation, the paradox of mortality, rather than taxidermy skill. Hirst still required a shark and formaldehyde, whereas future artists may only need to encode an art experience directly into the brain. DreamDiffusion as a novel method proposed by Bai et al. (2023) already demons- trated that EEG data from subjects could generate high-quality images and abstract art, proving that neural signals by themselves could constitute artistic expression, wi- thout traditional media. This process realizes “art without art,” by divorcing creati- vity from both technical skill and conscious intention. The key parallel to conceptual art lies in the detachment from material practice, neurotechnology merely pushes this detachment from the realm of ideas to the realm of neurons, challenging whe- ther dexterous making is essential to art when the brain’s aesthetic processes can be algorithmically actualized. The prospect of “art without art,” hinges on whether neurotechnology can decouple the aesthetic experience from external mediation. Traditional art requi- res sensory interaction, for example paint on canvas, but BCIs may enable direct stimulation of aesthetic neural networks. In his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Walter Benjamin (1936) argued that technology erodes art’s “aura”. Neurotechnology takes this one step further, if art becomes a direct neural signal, does it entirely lose its aura, or gain a new aura as a product of biological uniqueness? Considering neural artists who use EEG patterns to generate abstract art, the work’s meaning emerges not from brushstrokes but from the neurological data themselves, a form of “neuro-conceptualism.” This aligns with Sol LeWitt’s dic- tum: “The idea becomes a machine that makes the art” (1967). Here, the brain is the machine, and gAI is its operator. This resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “becoming-machine,” (1987) where human and technology merge into a creative assemblage.